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hat is the precise problem to be solved by the ‘Juncker plan’? It is the ‘investment 
gap’, which is estimated by the European Commission to be around €300 billion.1 
On the face of it, the €315 billion euro announced by Juncker as additional 
investment, even if distributed over three years, should make a material difference. 
However, we should also be careful not to compare apples with oranges, or rather pumpkins 
with oranges, in this case. Total investment constitutes the pumpkin, which amounts to 
about €2,600 billion per annum for the EU28. But the Juncker plan mainly targets 
infrastructure investment, which is comparable to an orange because it accounts for only 
about 10% of all investment (the remaining 90% is private) and runs to about €260 billion per 
annum. If the aim of the Juncker plan is to increase public investment by €315 billion over 
three years we should see infrastructure spending increase by €100 billion per annum, or 
almost 40% above its present level. This would appear to be wishful thinking, however, 
because all large projects require years of planning and the main obstacles are not usually 
financing but the ‘NIMBY’ complex, in all its various forms. 
As Gros (2014) showed recently, the investment gap is mainly a product of flawed thinking 
that neglects the impact of Europe’s demographic slowdown on the amount of investment 
that is required to keep a shrinking economy going. Moreover, a large part of the investment 
during the boom years up to 2007 was in wasteful construction, which should not serve as 
the benchmark for what level of investment is desirable today.2 
But even if we concede the point that more investment is desirable it is difficult to see how 
the Juncker plan could actually make a material difference. 
As President Juncker himself recognised at the beginning of his speech to the European 
Parliament, at present there is no shortage of funding available in the EU. The countries in 
the periphery of the euro area in which credit might still be scarce account for less than one-
quarter of Europe’s economy. A lack of funding is thus not the reason that investment 
                                                   
1 See (http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/jobs-growth-investment/plan/docs/factsheet1-why_en.pdf). 
2 Daniel Gros (2014), “Investment as the key to recovery in the euro area?”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 326 
(http://www.ceps.eu/node/9821). 
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remains weak in an economy where the banking system already has capital of over €1,000 
billion euro and outstanding loans of more than one hundred times that amount. Under 
these conditions, it is highly unlikely that €21 billion in loan guarantees could make a 
difference. The problem is thus presented as a risk issue. Yet risk is only part of the story, in 
particular for many of the key infrastructure projects that are blocked by national political 
and regulatory barriers. With the exception of funding for large innovative projects and 
innovative high-risk SMEs, the remaining areas of intervention cannot be solved by risk 
guarantees without fundamental structural reforms at national level. Education, for example, 
is not an area where one could use leveraged private sector funding.  
The origins of the €21 billion on which the entire plan is to be constructed are somewhat 
obscure. Five billion euros are supposed to come from the European Investment Bank (EIB), 
but it is not clear in what form. If it is in the form of capital then one might as well increase 
the capital of the EIB, but this does not seem to be on the cards. 
This leaves €16 billion, supposedly to come from the EU budget. But given that no increase 
in the EU budget has been proposed there can be no fresh money from this source; only a re-
arrangement of existing budget lines. Upon closer inspection it turns out that these €16 
billion consist of €8 billion in guarantees (already foreseen) and only €8 billion in ‘real 
money’. And this €8 billion of ‘real money’ are to a large extent made up of cuts in the 
funding for research and money already foreseen for financial instruments in the Connecting 
Europe Facility (CEF), which perform exactly the same operations and with a similar 
multiplier effect. There is no new money and no reallocations from EU budget programmes 
of doubtful usefulness for a modern economy (such as agriculture) that could at least have 
given some hope of a structural change in the EU budget. 
The remainder of the €21 billion would come from the €5 billion contribution (presumably of 
existing capital) from the EIB, which should then be levered up to €75 billion in loans to 
SMEs. Again, this is mostly fiction. The EIB has a staff of about 2,000 who manage about 
2,000 projects (one project per person). The average size of the EIB loans is around €70 to 
€100 million. It is thus clear that the EIB cannot reach SMEs directly. The EIB therefore 
provides groups of private commercial banks with a package of financing, leaving the banks 
to select the SMEs that receive credit with a small reduction in the interest rate and a small 
loss in participation by the EIB. There is a high risk that the commercial banks use this EIB 
financing for their favourite customers, to whom they were giving loans anyway.  
Moreover, it is difficult to see why the EIB would be an efficient vehicle to improve the 
availability of credit to SMEs while a number of national development banks in member 
states pursue the same goals and have the capacity to operate such programmes. Most SMEs 
operate mostly in the domestic market anyway, which implies that there is no particular 
reason for intervention by an EU institution if it is not focused on specific regions where this 
is necessary. 
All in all, the Juncker plan appears to be a rather desperate attempt to create the impression 
of a financing package of over €300 billion, but without actually having any margin of 
manoeuvre in the budget. This package looks a lot like the €120 billion package of the 
‘Growth Initiative’ that was announced amid much fanfare two years ago. Then, as today, 
most of the funding came from a re-allocation of budget lines, coupled with hopes of private-
sector participation. Very little of the €120 billion has been spent two years down the line. It 
is difficult to see why this time should be any different. 
Big promises are politically attractive because they show that Brussels ‘cares’ and is taking 
the growth problem seriously. But in the long run the political price of empty promises is 
high. 
THE JUNCKER PLAN: FROM €21 TO €315 BILLION, THROUGH SMOKE AND MIRRORS | 3 
 
There are, of course, large-scale projects that do make sense, such as cross-border 
interconnectors for electricity and gas. But the real obstacle to the integration of energy 
markets in Europe is not financing (large utilities can finance themselves anyway at very low 
rates), but the oligopolistic structure of the (national) markets, coupled with the tendency of 
member states to support their national champions. This is where the EU could do 
something useful, but there is no prospect of significant movement on this front. A 
courageous European Commission would have told member states that a financing package 
only makes sense if concrete steps towards an integrated energy market are accepted by 
member states. 
On balance, this European investment plan seems to consist mostly of a bundling of existing 
financial instruments into one package. Experience has shown that this repackaging yields 
little, apart from short-lived media attention.  
